Toward a systemic ethic: In search of the ethical basis for sustainability and precaution by Alrøe, Hugo Fjelsted & Kristensen, Erik Steen
Preprint 19.Sep.2001. A revised version of this paper is forthcoming in Environmental Ethics. 
Towards a Systemic Ethic 
In search of an Ethical Basis for Sustainability and Precaution 
Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe and Erik Steen Kristensen* 
 
ABSTRACT: Environmental issues and questions of sustainability and pre-
caution have come into focus in agriculture, and in society in general, in re-
cent decades. There are, however, many different meanings of sustainability 
and precaution, and there is no evident connection between these new nor-
mative concepts and the traditional moral theories. This paper seeks an ethi-
cal basis for sustainability and precaution – a common framework that can 
serve as a means of resolving the conceptual ambiguities of the new norma-
tive concepts and as a means of resolving conflicts between new and tradi-
tional moral concepts and theories. The method employed is to analyse the 
past and possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclusive 
framework of ethical extension. The extension of ethics is driven by the in-
creased awareness of several, not unrelated aspects, such as the similarities 
between man and other living beings and their common ecological relations, 
the increasing human influence on natural systems and processes, and the 
limits of human knowledge and control. In accordance, the analysis is char-
acterised by a systemic approach, and the established framework forms the 
basis for what we call a systemic ethic.  
 
 
I. THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABILITY AND PRECAUTION 
 
There is an increasing focus on environmental and global issues in society and this is 
reflected in the widespread use of concepts such as sustainability and the precautionary 
principle. These concepts, on the other hand, pose a challenge to ethical theory. Ethical 
conduct is an ancient theme in human thought, but sustainability and precaution are 
quite new normative concepts connected with the rapid scientific and technological de-
velopment and the growing environmental concern in the recent decades. In fact, the 
field of environmental ethics is only a few decades old. As late as in 1979, Goodpaster 
& Sayre noted that:  
Few philosophers have systematically addressed the difficult problems associated with 
applying ethical theory to social and environmental issues. … at a time in history when 
[human] behavior is increasingly consequential for human life and for life in general.1  
 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the moral basis for sustainability and 
precaution by way of a systemic approach to ethics. The concrete context of the paper is 
considerations on sustainability and precaution in agricultural research – in particular 
research in organic agriculture, which demonstrates an alternative agricultural practice 
and opens up for new perspectives on nature. But the scope of the investigation is not 
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restricted to agriculture. Agriculture can, in many ways, be taken as a fertile example 
for understanding the moral aspects of environmental problems. Agriculture is an an-
cient and very intimate relationship between man and nature that involves both ecologi-
cal and social systems, and agricultural production depends on natural processes that 
can only to some degree be controlled by man. Investigating environmental problems in 
agriculture involves the dual challenge of understanding complex ecological and bio-
physical processes, and handling the involvement of human actors, their practices and 
preferences – a situation that can be seen to be common to environmental issues in gen-
eral. This paper is therefore also relevant to the wider context of environmental ethics. 
 
There is, however, no single, well-defined meaning of either sustainability or precau-
tion.  
 
The diversity of meanings of sustainability can be analysed in relation to different per-
ceptions of nature. It is common to distinguish between different "myths of nature", 
where nature is seen as robust or vulnerable in terms of ecological resilience.2 This is 
related to the distinction between weak and strong sustainability in environmental eco-
nomics.3 Strong sustainability builds on two assumptions: that nature is (more or less) 
vulnerable and that society is dependent on nature in terms of basic life support ser-
vices. This means that manmade and natural capital cannot be infinitely substituted. 
Weak sustainability assumes that they can, and it is therefore essentially an economic 
concept that has no separate normative content. Strong sustainability has a normative 
content that is directed towards the value of the environment for present and future gen-
erations.  
 
Despite their differences, the above perceptions of nature and concepts of sustainability 
share a view of man as distinct from nature. They do not, however, explicate the rela-
tionship between man and nature. This is where agriculture brings in a new perspective 
on sustainability. Gordon Douglass has described three different meanings of agricul-
tural sustainability that are used by different groups with different views and values.4 
Food sufficiency speaks of sustainability in terms of sufficient food production in rela-
tion to future needs. The target is to be met through technological development and use 
of resources. Agriculture is an instrument for feeding the world, based on economic 
cost-benefit analyses. This usage is mainly found in conventional agriculture. Steward-
ship is concerned with the ecological balance and the biophysical limits to agricultural 
production. Sustainability in this sense constrains the production and determines desir-
able population levels. Community shares the concern for ecological balance, but with a 
focus on the permanence and self-reliance of the agricultural system and the effects of 
different agricultural systems on the social organisation and cultural values of rural life. 
This usage is mainly found in alternative forms of agriculture, including organic farm-
ing.  
 
On this background, we can distinguish between two different kinds of conceptions of 
man's relationship to nature. A distinctive kind that sees man as separate from nature, 
and a systemic kind that sees man as an integral part of nature (Figure 1). This leads to 
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three different views of nature. Within the distinctive conception of nature there are two 
opposite perspectives on nature and the value of nature. In the Culturist View of Nature 
the controlled, well-ordered and cultivated nature is the good nature, while the Natural-
ist View of Nature values the wild, authentic and uncontrolled nature – nature un-
touched by man. The systemic perspective on nature can be characterised as an Ecolo-
gist View of Nature, which values the intimate and mutually benign relations between 
human and nature. (These generic terms do, off course, not preclude that an agriculturist 
may have an Ecologist View of Nature, an ecologist may have a Naturalist View of Na-
ture, etc.) 
 
This threefold distinction can be used as a more comprehensive organising principle for 
evaluative (e.g. nature quality) and normative concepts that refer to nature and the envi-
ronment. For example in relation to the three meanings of sustainability identified by 
Douglass: food sufficiency takes a Culturist View of Nature, stewardship takes a Natu-
ralist View, and community takes an Ecologist View of Nature. Another example is the 
distinction between two schools within the philosophy of nature conservation, composi-
tionalism and functionalism,5 where compositionalism corresponds to the Naturalist 
View, while functionalism corresponds to the Ecologist View of Nature.  
 
 
Figure 1: Two different conceptions of the relationship between man and nature, dis-
tinctive and systemic, that imply three different views of nature. 
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Paul Thompson suggests that two philosophical approaches to sustainability have 
emerged: Resource sufficiency (which corresponds to Douglass’s food sufficiency) and 
functional integrity (which encompasses Douglass’s stewardship and community mean-
ings of sustainability).6 Resource sufficiency is an 'accounting' approach that presumes 
the ability to measure and calculate the proper balance between present resource use and 
future needs. This leads to debates over the potential for substitution of resources, such 
as the discussion of strong and weak sustainability referred to above. The notion of 
functional integrity presupposes an account of a system having crucial elements, such as 
soil, crops and livestock, ecosystems, cultural values and social institutions, which are 
reproduced over time in away that depends upon previous system states. The integrity 
may be nurtured or disrupted by human actions.  
 
Functional integrity does not in itself distinguish between the Ecologist View of Nature, 
where humans are within the system considered, and the Naturalist View of Nature, 
which considers ecological systems from outside. But Thompson's dual distinction re-
veals another aspect of sustainability. He points out that ignorance is handled differently 
in the two approaches. Resource sufficiency is concerned with anticipation, making 
predictions and calculating the foreseeable supplies and needs based on available 
knowledge. Functional integrity emphasises resilience, development of capacities for 
coping and compensating, and avoidance of irreversible effects, based on recognition of 
the limits of human knowledge. The distinction made by Thompson therefore reveals a 
close connection between different conceptions of sustainability and different views of 
the scope and limits of human knowledge. The latter differences are central to precau-
tion as a normative concept. 
 
There are different approaches to precaution in society. These are related to different 
conceptions of scientific knowledge and control, which lead to different approaches to 
handling uncertainty and ignorance.7 Conventional rational decision making involves 
risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses that support acting in proportion to the calcu-
lated risks or, more generally, the expected utility. This approach to ignorance can be 
termed 'rational precaution' (in the same sense as 'rational choice theory'). It is based on 
the available scientific knowledge and ignores ignorance – ignorance regarding the 
causal consequences of the decision, or regarding the values and preferences of those 
who might be affected. A different approach to ignorance, known as the precautionary 
principle, has emerged in the context of environmental law.8 This approach to ignorance 
can be termed 'reflexive precaution'. It involves reflections on the limits of knowledge 
and control, and deliberate strategies for handling ignorance and uncertainty. According 
to the precautionary principle, the responsibility towards future as well as present gen-
erations obliges us to preserve the natural basis of life and avoid irreversible changes 
with unforeseeable consequences. The principle requires that preventive action be taken 
(e.g. by saying no to unpredictable technological activities) when there is a possibility 
of severe or irreversible damage to the environment. The core is that decisions makers 
must act in advance of conclusive scientific evidence of the danger. This strategy is 
supplemented with the development of society's capacity for early detection of dangers 
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through comprehensive research, and the development and promotion of cleaner 
technologies.9  
 
The present paper seeks an ethical basis for sustainability and precaution.10 A common 
framework that can serve as a means of resolving the conceptual ambiguities in the 
practical use of the new normative concepts and as a means of resolving conflicts be-
tween new and traditional moral concepts and theories. The method that is employed 
here is to analyse the past and possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclu-
sive framework of ethical extension. The extension of ethics has been driven by the in-
creased awareness of several, not unrelated aspects, such as the similarities and relations 
between man and other living beings, and the increasing human influence on natural 
systems and processes. In accordance, the analysis is characterised by a systemic ap-
proach, and the established framework forms the basis for what we call a systemic ethic. 
 
There is a traditional distinction between non-consequentialist ethics, which focus on 
the intention or motivation behind the act (such as character, virtues, duties), and conse-
quentialist ethics, which focus on the consequences of the act (such as utility). The dis-
tinction can be illustrated by a simple model of moral acting: 
(moral agent)  intentions Æ acts Æ consequences  (moral object) 
We need to go beyond this distinction to understand sustainability and precaution, be-
cause both these traditions are insufficient in front of the rapid technological develop-
ment and the limited knowledge of the consequences of new technology. In particular, 
there is a need to go beyond the individualism and rationalism of classical humanist and 
utilitarian ethics,11 towards a systemic ethic of responsible acting. That is, an ethic that 
incorporates the present understanding of social and ecological systems, and which puts 
emphasis on acts rather than intentions and consequences.  
 
The systemic approach maintains a traditional Aristotelian conception of ethics as criti-
cal reflection upon our ideas of the good life and right acting. This understanding of 
ethics presumes moral agents with self-awareness. That is, a self-reflexive cognitive 
ability to see oneself as another by way of taking another's point of view on oneself and 
one's actions. And, hence, an ability to see others as oneself – an ability that can support 
feelings of sympathy as a motivation for moral acting. Self-awareness is also the basis 
for responsible acting – the awareness of a choice of action implies moral responsibility.  
 
 
II. THE EXTENSION OF MORAL CONSIDERABILITY 
 
The historical roots of ethics are found in the relations between the individual and the 
members of the local community. Ethics concerned the direct dealing of man with man, 
including the dealing with himself. From today's viewpoint, history shows an extension 
of ethics from the consideration for one's fellows towards the inclusion of equal men, 
slaves and women. In the last centuries different theories of ethics have included the 
universal consideration for all persons (rational beings) or human beings and, more re-
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cently, future people and sentient beings. And in the latest decades, the possible further 
extension of ethics to include living beings and ecosystems has been thoroughly dis-
cussed.  
 
In order to analyse the past and possible future extension of ethics, we need to go into 
the different aspects of ethical acting in some detail and discriminate between different 
dimensions of the extension. First, we shall look at the step beyond a symmetrical ethics 
that is based on a mutual obligation between equals. Going beyond a symmetrical ethics 
involves the distinction between moral responsibility, concerning the moral agent, and 
moral considerability, concerning the object of moral consideration. 
 
In the history of western culture, ethics was mostly anthropocentric and symmetrical. 
Those who were taken into ethical consideration were themselves capable of moral ac-
tion. This symmetry is expressed in the so-called golden rule of ethics, here from the 
gospel of Matthew: "In everything, do to others what you would have them do to you". 
In the very influential ethics of Immanuel Kant there is also a symmetrical foundation, 
expressed in his well-known single categorical imperative of morality: "Act only on that 
maxim which you can at the same time will, that it should become a universal law."12 A 
universal symmetrical ethics such as Kant's, entailing that all those capable of moral 
action, and only those, are worthy of moral consideration, can provide a rationale for an 
extension of ethics beyond one's fellows, but it also precludes the extension of moral 
considerability beyond persons. Granting a distinction between moral responsibility and 
moral considerability, on the other hand, leaves open the possible extension of moral 
considerability. The distinction also allows for a separate inquiry into the space of moral 
responsibility (see further in section V).  
 
There are different approaches and arguments to the question of where the limit of 
moral considerability is to be drawn. The history of ethics shows some exceptions to the 
dominance of symmetrical ethics, such as the Epicureans, who took the good to be 
pleasure, and recognised that animals as well as humans were capable of feeling pleas-
ure and pain.13 In most cases, however, any moral consideration for animals was based 
on concern for the ensuing effects on human moral. Explicit ethical concerns for higher 
animals were raised in the late 18th century and in the 19th century, for example in the 
utilitarian ethics of Jeremy Bentham. But only in the 1970's did animal rights become a 
serious and much debated philosophical subject.14 The humanitarian movement was, 
however, in itself part of an extension beyond the symmetrical ethics of persons. The 
symmetrical ethics is a logically consistent position, but the logic excludes young chil-
dren and mentally disabled humans from moral consideration. On the other hand, con-
sidering all human beings, but no other sentient beings, worthy of moral consideration 
seems to be difficult to defend against a charge of human chauvinism, or speciesism as 
Peter Singer has called it, because there seems to be no morally relevant means of estab-
lishing human beings as a separate logical category for moral consideration.15 With the 
capacity to suffer, or to experience pain and pleasure, as a criterion, there is a strong 
argument for drawing the limit of moral considerability at sentient beings (leaving the 
definition of 'a sentient being' as a subject for further discussion).  
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Environmental ethics has been concerned with a further extension of moral consid-
erability.16 Many different kinds of ethics, in terms of the sphere of considerability, may 
entail an environmental ethic in the sense of 'a concern for the human environment'. 
William K. Frankena lists eight different 'ethics about the environment' with different 
spheres of considerability, arguing that each can entail an environmental ethic.17 The 
first five are characterised by still wider spheres, the limits being: 1. oneself, 2. humans 
or persons, 3. sentient beings, 4. living beings, 5. everything. Type 6 includes only God 
as a moral object, type 7 includes God and one of the first five types, and type 8 in-
cludes only Nature. These environmental ethics will, as Frankena readily admits, be 
different, and he casts his vote on an ethics where only sentient beings are morally con-
siderable, leaving the rest of the environment to be considered as values in relation to 
humans and sentient beings. Frankena's point is that we may very well decide to protect 
the environment because it is of value to us, while not acknowledging any moral con-
sideration for non-sentient beings. (The relation between value and moral value is dis-
cussed further in section VII)  
 
Type 8 in Frankena's list of ethics is ambiguous as to whether nature is to be left alone 
(the Naturalist View of Nature) or to be cooperated with, followed and imitated (the 
Ecologist View of Nature). It is therefore not very helpful as a moral guideline. The 
other seven ethics focus on individuals, and the moral considerability of ecological sys-
tems comes in only as an appendix to the considerability of 'everything' (type 5). Since 
the considerability of 'everything' is next to a reductio ad absurdum of the idea of an 
extension of moral considerability, Frankena's structuring of environmental ethics is not 
favourable to the idea that communities and ecosystems might deserve moral considera-
tion. Views of moral considerability that are based solely on an individualistic approach 
cannot form a sufficient basis for a systemic normative concept like the functional in-
tegrity conception of sustainability.  
 
Kenneth Goodpaster has argued that the two major foundational accounts of morality of 
the modern period – the 'Humean' family of utilitarian ethics where moral predicates are 
derived from the interests of individuals, and the 'Kantian' family where ethical impera-
tives are derived from the rational generalisation of the intrinsic worth of individual 
beings – share a basic 'individualistic' model of moral sentiment or reason.18 And he 
further states that when the individualistic model is the only model available, "its im-
plausibilities will keep us from dealing ethically with environmental obligations or ide-
als altogether". The historical dominance of the individualistic perspective does not, 
however, entail that this is the only perspective from which moral considerability can be 
viewed, as indicated by Goodpaster's plea to, in a sense, "return to the richer Greek con-
ception of a man by nature social … – though it goes beyond the Greek conception in 
emphasising that societies too need to be understood in a context, an ecological context, 
and that it is this larger whole which is the 'bearer of value'." 19 
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III. INDIVIDUALISTIC AND SYSTEMIC APPROACHES TO  
MORAL CONSIDERABILITY 
 
Two perspectives on the extension of ethics are of particular interest in relation to sus-
tainability, because they involve a systemic approach to ethics. They are the ecological 
perspective, represented here by Aldo Leopold, and the technological perspective repre-
sented by Hans Jonas. Leopold, the founder of the 'holistic' form of environmental eth-
ics, took ethics to be a body of self-imposed limitations on freedom of action, based on 
the recognition that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts 
(corresponding to an Ecologist View of Nature). In "The Land Ethic" he described the 
historical extension of ethics from tribal members to men from other tribes and other 
races, and to slaves and women, and argued for a further extension toward incorporating 
the biotic community: "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community 
to include soils, waters, plants and animals, or collectively: the land. … The extension 
of ethics to this … element in human environments is, if I read the evidence correctly, 
an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity." 20  
 
While Leopold is regarded as the most important source of modern biocentric or holistic 
ethics,21 there were important precursors to his evolutionary account of ethics, such as 
William E.H. Lecky and Charles Darwin.22 Darwin wrote on the social nature of ethics 
in "The Descent of Man":  
Finally the social instincts, which no doubt were acquired by man as by the lower animals 
for the good of the community, will from the first have given to him some wish to aid his 
fellows, some feeling of sympathy, and have compelled him to regard their approbation 
and disapprobation. Such impulses will have served him at a very early period as a rude 
rule of right and wrong. But as man gradually advanced in intellectual power, and was en-
abled to trace the more remote consequences of his actions … [and as] his sympathies be-
came more tender and widely diffused, extending to men of all races, to the imbecile, 
maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals, – so 
would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher.23 
 
But still, Leopold's 'biotic community' was a radical, novel conception in ethics, because 
it took a distinctly systemic perspective on man as part of nature, spurred by ecological 
science. As J. Baird Callicott succinctly stated it: "… ecology changes our values by 
changing our concepts of the world and of ourselves in relation to the world".24  
 
Darwin's mention of the ability to "trace the more remote consequences of actions" 
points towards the other systemic approach, the ethics of technology. In the traditional 
ethics, the right way of acting was determined from the immediate consequences, and 
far and future effects were left to the workings of chance, fate or providence. The prac-
tical knowledge necessary for living a good life was not dependent on any special, ex-
pert knowledge. No-one was held responsible for the unintended long-term effects of 
his well-intentioned, well-considered and well-performed act.25 Today, the traditional 
ethics of face to face encounters is overextended due to the range of the consequences 
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of human technological action and the magnitude of risks associated with the techno-
logical development.  
Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and consequences 
that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them. … No previous ethics 
had to consider the global condition of human life and the far-off future, even existence, 
of the race. These now being an issue demands, in brief, a new conception of duties and 
rights, for which previous ethics and metaphysics provide not even the principles, let 
alone a ready doctrine.26  
According to Hans Jonas, the expansion of human power through the collective practice 
of technology has created an ethical vacuum. And "novel powers to act require novel 
ethical rules and perhaps even a new ethics".27 Jonas summarises the new duties corre-
sponding to our new powers in his theory of responsibility.28 The expansion of the range 
and impact of our collective actions and our increased awareness of possible far and 
future consequences moves the principle of responsibility into the very centre of ethics. 
We postpone the treatment of these systemic aspects of human action to section V, and 
investigate the systemic approach to moral considerability in more detail here below. 
 
J. Baird Callicott distinguished between the animal liberation movement and an envi-
ronmental ethics in the tradition of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic.29 The extension of ethics 
to sentient animals in the animal rights movement is individualistic in the same way as 
traditional humanism. Contrary to this, the Leopoldian environmental ethics is holistic, 
locating ultimate value in 'the biotic community': "A thing is right when it tends to pre-
serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends to do otherwise." 30 And Leopold's extension of ethics is much more sweeping 
than the animal rights movement's inclusion of sentient animals, since it enlarges the 
boundaries of the moral community to include soils, waters, and plants as well as ani-
mals. 
 
In line with Goodpaster and Callicott we distinguish between two different paths of ex-
tension of moral considerability: an individualistic extension in kind and a systemic 
community extension. The individualistic considerability can be extended in the famil-
iar way from the individual moral agent to others of – more or less – the same kind: 
fellows, persons, human beings, sentient beings, living beings, and things. The possible 
systemic extension moves along a different path: from individual to family (perhaps 
including family animals, such as hunting dogs, horses, livestock, or pets), and further 
to the local community, the larger ecological community (the land and the humans, 
animals, plants, and other beings living on the land), and the universe.  
 
While this distinction between an individualistic and a systemic path of extension of 
moral considerability is in line with recent trends in ethics, some justification is needed 
as to why this is more than a contingent distinction. Goodpaster framed the central prob-
lem of modern ethics as the problem of overcoming egoism.31 The justification provided 
here is based on there being two separate ways of 'overcoming egoism', in line with the 
18th century discussion of moral sense, which distinguished between 'enlightened self-
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interest' and 'disinterested benevolence'. The two ways of overcoming egoism are ways 
of 'extending the self': an (individualistic) extension by way of identification with other 
individual 'selves' and a (systemic) extension by way of expanding the boundary of ones 
own 'self'.  
 
 
IV. TWO WAYS OF 'EXTENDING THE SELF' 
 
In "The social theory of the self" George Mead has described the 'I' and the 'me' as dif-
ferent aspects of the self (that is, the self seen from different perspectives) in the process 
of self-consciousness.32 The 'I' is the actor as well as, but not at the same time as, the 
observer of the 'me'. Or in other terms, the 'me' is the self as an object – that which is 
presented to the 'I' as self. This view is based on a social conception of self, where the 
self which consciously stands over against other selves thereby becomes an object, an 
other to himself.33 Mead's theory of the social self lends itself directly to the individual-
istic path of extension of moral considerability, since self-awareness entails the ability 
to see oneself as another by way of taking another's point of view on oneself and one's 
actions and, hence (by inference from this knowledge of oneself as object and subject to 
the subjects of similar objects), an ability to see others as oneself – as autonomous sub-
jects with interests more or less like oneself. In other words, the individualistic moral 
considerability is based on identifying with the other as an 'I' in certain respects.34  
 
The rational acknowledgement that another is a subject with interests like oneself, forms 
a basis for identifying with the other and thus for feelings of sympathy, empathy, or 
love – this is the way of 'disinterested benevolence'. Hans Jonas says that "it is indeed of 
the essence of our moral nature that the appeal, as insight transmits it, finds an answer in 
our feeling. It is the feeling of responsibility." And he continues: 
ethics has an objective side and a subjective side, the one having to do with reason, the 
other with emotion. … the two sides are mutually complementary and both are integral to 
ethics itself. Without our being, at least by disposition, responsive to the call of duty in 
terms of feeling, the most cogent demonstration of this right, even when compelling theo-
retical assent, would be powerless to make it a motivating force.35 
 
The systemic expansion of the self rests on the perception of 'the other' as being, in a 
certain respect, part of oneself – included in an expanded ecological or relationary per-
ception of self. In an ecological understanding of humans as part of nature, the self is a 
centre of organisation, with Paul Shepard's term, constantly drawing on and influencing 
the surroundings, and there is no sharp boundary between self and not self. In the words 
of Alan Watts, inspired by oriental philosophy: "The world is your body".36 Callicott 
quotes Holmes Rolston's meditations on a lake shore:  
The waters of North Inlet are part of my circulatory system; and the more literally we take 
this truth the more nearly we understand it. I incarnate the solar energies that flow through 
this lake. No one is free-living … Bios [life] is intrinsically symbiosis.37  
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And Callicott continues: 
As one moves, in imagination, outwardly from the core of one's organism, it is impossible 
to find a clear demarcation between oneself and one's environment. … Ecology, thus, 
gives a new meaning as well as new substance to the phrase 'enlightened self-interest'.38 
In Mead's terms, this can be seen as based on an expansion of 'me' – of the moral agent's 
representation of 'myself' as an object. We can thus consider the local community and 
the wider ecological system as part of an expanded 'me'. The rational acknowledgement 
that 'the other' is part of an expanded 'me' forms a basis for identifying (in a different 
sense from above) with the larger system and thus for feelings of self-love – and this is 
the way of 'enlightened self-interest'.  
 
The two ways of extending the self forms a foundation for extending moral consid-
erability along two different paths, an individualistic and a systemic. The two perspec-
tives may also be combined so that the moral consideration of an individual includes the 
systemic consideration based on that subject's perspective.  
 
 
V. TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICAL EXTENSION 
 
Above, we have distinguished between moral responsibility and moral considerability, 
and discussed the extension of moral considerability and the distinction between indi-
vidualistic and systemic aspects of considerability. This is, however, not a sufficient 
framework for discussing the normative aspects of sustainability and precaution.  
 
In Hans Jonas's theory of moral responsibility the extension of ethics is linked to the 
expansion of the range of our collective actions and of our knowledge of far and future 
consequences – uncertain as it is.39 Taking responsible acting as the basis for the analy-
sis of the extension of ethics (instead of moral considerability) allows for a broader ethi-
cal framework. A framework that can encompass issues such as the problems concern-
ing technological development, the limits of knowledge, and the responsibility of social 
systems. In this light it is evident that we need to distinguish further dimensions of 
moral extension, apart from responsibility and considerability, in order to establish an 
inclusive systemic framework for ethics. But it is not clear exactly what constitutes 
those dimensions.  
 
In order to determine the relevant dimensions in which an extension of ethics may take 
place, we need to elaborate on the simple model of moral acting presented in section I. 
The new model of moral acting is a second order model that includes self-observation. 
That is, it is based on a theory of second order cybernetics and a theory of self-
referential systems.40  
 
In this model, shown in Figure 2, we find first of all the moral agent and the object of 
moral consideration, the moral object. These two elements correspond to the dimen-
sions of moral responsibility and moral considerability. Furthermore, we find the moral 
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agent's acts, the consequences brought about by these acts and the impacts on the moral 
object. These elements correspond to a third dimension of ethics, namely the action 
ability of the agent, which Jonas took as his starting point.  
 
The remaining elements in the model correspond to a fourth dimension of ethics, which 
concerns the type of grounds for moral action. The model shows three types of proc-
esses with respect to the grounds of action: 0) A non-cybernetic process where the 
intentions form the only grounds of action without 'feedback' (such a system could be 
the result of natural or cultural evolution as suggested by Darwin). 1) A first order 
cybernetic process that includes feedback from the agent's observation of the 
consequences of the acts and the impacts on the moral object. Here the agent's acts are 
grounded on the known consequences (besides the intentions). 2) A second order 
cybernetic process that includes self-observation – the observation of oneself as oneself 
– and thus forms the basis for critical reflection. In particular, second order observation 
(the observation of observation) can expose the limitations of particular observations 
and the ensuing limits of knowledge concerning consequences and impacts. It can 
thereby reveal the moral import of ignorance and uncertainty by way of including 
unknown consequences as grounds of action.  
 
Moral 
agent 
Acts Consequences
(Unknown + Known)
Observation
Intentions
Self-observation
Moral 
object
Impacts
(2. order)
(1. order)
(0. order)
 
Figure 2:  A second order cybernetic model of moral acting, which can be used to de-
termine the possible dimensions of ethical extension (shown in Figure 3). 
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Based on the model of moral acting we can identify four dimensions of ethical exten-
sion, which are shown in Figure 3. The dimension of moral considerability, referring to 
the moral object, has already been discussed in some detail above.  
 
The dimension of moral responsibility refers to the moral agent. It is therefore con-
strained to self-aware beings and cannot be extended in the way of considerability (to 
sentient beings, for instance). Accordingly, moral responsibility has traditionally been 
understood as individual or personal responsibility. But the growing complexity of hu-
man society and the dramatic development of collective technological action abilities 
give reasons for considering human societies, organisations, and corporations as moral 
agents.41 This means that we can speak of the collective social responsibility of such 
social systems – and of the demand for developing social systems that can take on a 
global responsibility.42 In this vein, Sytse Strijbos asks: "What societal agents are re-
sponsible for particular developments? How are the different responsibilities of the 
agents related to each other and how are they coordinated?" and suggests that "what can 
be of help here is a systems view of technology that clarifies the interweavement be-
tween human actions at the various systems levels and the responsibilities that belong to 
a variety of agents at these levels." 43  
 
Considerability (moral object)
Moral
grounds 
of action
Action
ability
known
consequences
unknown
consequences
intentions
things
sentient beings
humans
fellows
global ecological
community
cumulative
individual
technological
social
global
personal
Responsibility (moral agent)
living beings
oneself
family
persons
local ecological
community
individualistic:systemic:
universe
 
 
Figure 3:  An inclusive framework for ethical extension, which forms the basis for a 
systemic ethic. The four dimensions correspond to the elements of the model of moral 
acting in Figure 2. 
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From this it appears that the extension of responsibility is closely related to the third 
dimension, action ability, which refers to the types of acts and consequences that the 
agent can initiate. Action ability may be individual, cumulative – involving more of the 
same kind of individual actions, such as in an increase of the human population size – or 
technological – that is, involving new kinds of human action.44 For instance, the so-
called 'tragedy of the commons' is a moral aspect of the cumulative consequences of 
individually harmless actions. On the other hand, the technological development in ag-
riculture, for instance, in terms of machines, chemical engineering, biotechnology, and 
genetic engineering introduces entirely new kinds of human action into the world. 
Technological actions are essentially collective actions of social systems. In the words 
of Strijbos: "Technology is no longer simply a matter of objects in the hands of indi-
viduals; it has become a very complex system in which our everyday lives are embed-
ded. The systemic character of modern technology confronts us with relatively new 
questions and dimensions of human responsibility." 45 As a remark in passing, the ('pas-
sive') responsibility for constraining unwanted consequences is but one aspect of in-
creased action abilities – another aspect is the ('active') responsibility to utilise the new 
action abilities to help and protect those in need. With respect to this, the limits of 
knowledge and control cautions against active interference where the consequences 
cannot be foreseen. This forms a link to the last dimension of our framework for ethical 
extension. 
 
The fourth dimension, moral grounds of action, concerns the types of grounds that the 
agent employs in moral acts, here characterised as intentions, known consequences and 
unknown consequences. The primary grounds of action are always intentions, broadly 
construed as including the representation of the object, the motivations of the agent, and 
moral principles of acting. The intentions can be altered if the known consequences and 
impacts, which are exposed by first order observations (see Figure 2), are included as 
moral grounds of action. Moreover, the unknown consequences and impacts can be in-
cluded as a third type of moral grounds of action, based on the acknowledgement of the 
limits of observation and knowledge that are revealed by self-observation. Including 
unknown consequences diminishes the moral importance of the known consequences, 
and therefore increases the importance of intentions and principles of moral acting, but 
it also provides a new basis for critical reflection on the intentions and principles of act-
ing.46 The inclusion of ignorance and uncertainty as moral grounds of action is exempli-
fied in the use of the principle of precaution in environmental policy. It also plays an 
important role in understanding the different ways that the concept of sustainability is 
used. This is particularly evident in the previously mentioned distinction between re-
source sufficiency and functional integrity. In addition, an increased awareness of the 
limits of knowledge puts a new perspective on the questions of moral considerability 
and moral significance. With reference to the model of moral acting in Figure 2, it is 
clear that the impacts on the object of moral consideration are even harder to observe 
than the consequences of ones acts, because the impacts depend on the interests, well-
being, or integrity of the moral objects. And these effects cannot be known from out-
side. With respect to human welfare, for instance, this problem can to some degree be 
circumvented by way of linguistic communication. In animal welfare we must rely on 
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non-linguistic communication and empathy to supplement scientific observations – and 
on the knowledge of our ignorance as a moral ground of action. 
 
The inclusive systemic framework of ethics, which we have described above, provides a 
tool for structuring and analysing normative concepts and in this way it can contribute 
to the resolution of moral conflicts. The precautionary principle can be seen as a moral 
principle that is based on the extension of human action ability and moral grounds of 
action (with the systemic relations between man and nature as a necessary background). 
A related principle from environmental policy, the polluter pays principle, can be seen 
as a moral principle that is based on the extension of human action ability and moral 
responsibility. Sustainability as functional integrity can be seen as a moral principle that 
is based on the extension of systemic moral considerability and the acknowledgement of 
ignorance as a moral ground of action. 
 
We use the term 'systemic ethic' to designate an ethical stance that includes all the sys-
temic aspects of ethical extension in the framework – systemic considerability, social 
responsibility, technological action ability, and ignorance as a moral ground of action. 
Some of the implications and pertinent questions of a systemic ethic will be discussed 
briefly in the last sections, including a discussion of the relation to some more familiar 
concepts within environmental ethics, such as non-anthropocentrism and the intrinsic 
value of nature.  
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION OF NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM, EQUITY  
AND MORAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
In environmental ethics the extension of ethics is often discussed in terms of anthropo-
centrism and non-anthropocentrism. The traditional anthropocentric view is a position 
within an individualistic, humanistic ethics, and non-anthropocentric views indicate an 
extension of moral considerability beyond the limits of anthropocentrism. However, it is 
often not made clear whether the limit of considerability is drawn at persons (in a sym-
metrical ethics) or at humans, although these two positions are philosophically very 
different. 'Non-anthropocentric' is the general term for an extension beyond persons or 
humans, and there are a number of more specific concepts such as pathocentric (from 
'pathos': suffering, experience, emotion), biocentric, and ecocentric. 'Pathocentric' and 
'biocentric' correspond to including, respectively, sentient beings and living beings into 
moral considerability. 'Ecocentric', on the other hand, is not non-anthropocentric in the 
sense of extending individualistic considerability, but involves an entirely different path 
of extension – the path of systemic considerability. The non-anthropocentric concepts 
are apt and widespread in use, but the distinction between individualistic and systemic 
considerability as two different ways of extending moral considerability, allows for 
more precise indications of ethical positions and thus for more clarity in the theoretical 
discussions. 
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Wherever the limit of moral considerability is drawn, the very extension of 
considerability beyond persons calls for a further distinction such as Goodpaster's 
distinction between moral considerability and moral significance.47 Even though all 
living beings, for instance, are considered morally considerable, living, sentient and 
self-aware beings need not be considered of equal moral significance – they should not 
necessarily be treated alike in moral judgements.  
 
Goodpaster's distinction allows us to distinguish between the extension of moral consid-
erability and the ensuing questions of equity within the sphere of moral considerability. 
The common non-anthropocentric terms tend to conflate the issues of extension and 
equity, because the suffix 'centric' implies not only an extension of considerability but 
also a shift of moral significance, assigning equal moral significance to, for instance, a 
pig and a person.48 Such a shift is rightfully criticised for justifying acts that are inhu-
mane in the sense of being unjust to persons.49 Equity does not necessarily imply equal 
treatment. Speaking in terms of an extension of moral considerability does not imply 
such a shift, because we can discuss the question of moral significance separately – but 
the extension of considerability obviously determines the range within which we can 
discuss moral significance. In other words, moral considerability deals with the univer-
sality aspect of equity (what kinds of moral objects enter into our considerations of eq-
uity?) while moral significance deals with the justice aspect (what does equity between 
these objects mean?).  
 
The question of moral significance thus involves the question of what equity and just 
treatment means. Justice in the Aristotelian sense means proportional treatment, where 
like instances are treated alike.50 The crucial question is which similarities and differ-
ences are considered relevant. According to Peter Singer, species membership is not a 
relevant reason for treating non-humans different from humans.51 His concept of 'animal 
liberation' points out the analogy between the unjust, unequal consideration of slaves, of 
women, and of animals on farms and labs. On the other hand, an 'egalitarian pathocen-
tric view' (extending moral considerability to sentient beings and taking all sentient be-
ings to be of equal significance), where only the sense of pain and pleasure is consid-
ered relevant, must be judged unjust if self-awareness is included as being of moral 
relevance, because equity then means treating persons differently from sentient beings 
without self-awareness.52  
 
In order to distinguish the just from the unjust differences in moral significance, we 
need a criterion for the relevance of differences. Equity, in the present framework, is 
associated with either individualistic or systemic significance. Individualistic signifi-
cance involves empirical questions concerning general differences between kinds of 
beings (sometimes discussed in the form of levels of being53). The relevance of a differ-
ence depends on whether it is related to the well-being of the individual and to the 
sense-ability and type of autonomy involved. In the systemic perspective, it is difficult 
to speak of the well-being of ecosystems, for instance, since there seems to be limited 
empirical support for an organismic view of ecosystems.54 Instead, systemic signifi-
cance involves empirical questions concerning the relative functional importance of 
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different processes of social and ecological dynamics (often discussed in terms of sus-
tainability). The relevance of a difference in systemic significance depends on whether 
it is related to the functional integrity of the system – that is, the structure of connec-
tions and processes that sustains the system.55 
 
The functional integrity of the system is established by the web of relations between the 
physical, genetic, physiological, and social 'memory-structures' in the system, which 
secure the reproduction of system elements and processes. No single individual being or 
lineage is 'sustainable' in itself. Some kinds of living beings and physical processes, 
which we consider of little or no individual moral significance, are of great systemic 
moral significance with reference to the functional integrity of the ecological commu-
nity. But any single individual, or group of individuals, has very limited systemic sig-
nificance – unless they are the bearers of a functional role in the system and therefore 
play a key role in sustaining the system or a subsystem, in which case a systemic sig-
nificance is added to their individual significance. In this way the significance of, for 
instance, the remaining individuals of a threatened species can increase. 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION OF THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF NATURE 
 
It is a widely held idea that a 'proper' environmental ethics must be based on there being 
intrinsic values in nature (as opposed to nature being only of instrumental value to 
man), because this would be a necessary and sufficient ground for human obligations to 
non-human nature.56 A common line of argument is to establish this necessary connec-
tion by way of defending the existence of objective intrinsic values in nature.57 This 
argument, however, presupposes that intrinsic values have moral import – and this ques-
tion is impeded by the many senses of 'intrinsic value'. In other words, a key problem 
with the language of values and intrinsic values is that it tends to confuse questions of 
value and ethics. In this paper we have treated the moral considerability of nature with-
out reference to intrinsic value. From this basis the question of the moral import of in-
trinsic value in its different senses can be addressed and the implications for value the-
ory drawn out.  
 
The systemic ethic takes a relational view of values in line with the systemic or rela-
tional view of nature. According to H. Richard Niebuhr a relational value theory "is 
objective in the sense that value relations are understood to be independent of the feel-
ings of an observer but not in the sense that value is itself an objective kind of reality".58 
Niebuhr shows how relational value-thinking can be found implicit in both objectivist 
and subjectivist positions, and how the dichotomy thus masks a common relationary 
ground. Relational value theory is relativistic (in the sense known from physics), or con-
textual, and therefore incompatible with the idea of an ideal observer, but not with the 
idea of objective methods of research with due attendance to the viewpoint of the ob-
server and to the interplay of facts and values.59 On this basis, a certain structure can be 
impressed on the concepts of intrinsic value as indicated in the brief discussion below 
(see also the overview in Table 1).  
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John O'Neill distinguishes between three different basic senses of intrinsic value: Intrin-
sic value1 meaning non-instrumental value, intrinsic value2 meaning the value of an ob-
ject in virtue of its non-relational properties (as employed by G.E. Moore), and intrinsic 
value3 meaning 'objective value', which an object possesses independently of the valua-
tions of valuers.60 Tom Regan gives a different threefold distinction where intrinsic 
value is understood as either a mental-state, a state-of-affairs, or an end-in-itself.61 
O'Neill's intrinsic value1 conflates Regan's end-in-itself and mental-state – there are two 
kinds of opposites to instrumental value: intrinsic value (Reagan's end-in-itself) and 
immediate value. Immediate value includes Regan's mental-state (experiential value) as 
well as for example physiological value, and it is in opposition to mediate or instrumen-
tal values, such as contributive (part), productive (tool) and substitutive (exchange, 
market) values. Regan's state-of-affairs corresponds to O'Neill's intrinsic value2, but 
value in this non-relational sense has no place in a relational view of values. O'Neill's 
intrinsic value3, objective values, must either pertain to a value relation, in which case 
the term intrinsic value seems inappropriate (because the 'objectivity' of a value relation 
does not in itself imply moral import), or to a non-relational value, in which case it must 
be discarded here together with intrinsic value2.  
  
Table 1: Different senses of 'intrinsic value' compared with a relational theory of values. 
Common terms O'Neill Reagan Relational value theory 
End-in-
itself 
Intrinsic value: Individualistic and 
systemic moral con-
siderability 
2. order 
or moral 
values 
Non-
instrumental 
value 
Intrinsic 
value1 
Mental-
state  
Immediate value: E.g. experiential and 
physiological value 
Non-relational 
value (Moore) 
Intrinsic 
value2 
State-of-
affairs 
(non- existent) 
Objective value Intrinsic 
value3 
 (ambiguous) 
Instrumental 
value 
  Mediate value: Contributive,  
productive and 
substitutive value 
1. order 
values 
 
As we stated above, speaking only in terms of values and intrinsic values tends to con-
fuse questions of value and ethics. Of the senses treated above, only the intrinsic value 
of an individual being as an end-in-itself has direct moral import, given that it corre-
sponds to individualistic moral considerability. When using the language of values in 
ethics, we need to distinguish between moral values, or second order values, such as the 
intrinsic value of a person, and first order values, such as the experiential and instru-
mental values of that person. It is not values as such that are considerable in ethics, but 
the other individual or the larger community.62 The importance of this distinction only 
becomes evident when the limits of knowledge are taken into account. When there is 
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limited knowledge of the values of some moral object, the (second order) moral value 
implies a cautious and conservative attitude towards encroaching on the object.    
 
Analogously to the individualistic intrinsic values of individual beings, we can speak of 
a systemic intrinsic value, corresponding to systemic moral considerability, which des-
ignates the moral value of the larger system that the moral agent is a part of. Moreover, 
this systemic aspect transfers to the consideration for other individuals, whether they 
themselves are moral agents or not, so that every individualistic intrinsic value is con-
nected with a systemic intrinsic value.63 The moral value of the other entails the moral 
value of the larger system that the other is a part of. And the systemic values connected 
to the perspectives of different individuals in the same ecological community are – to 
some degree – different aspects of a common systemic intrinsic value. We may there-
fore speak more loosely of the intrinsic value (meaning: moral considerability) of nature 
or natural processes, when there is little need or possibility for distinguishing between 
the individual and systemic aspects of intrinsic value – as long as we do not conflate this 
with other senses of 'intrinsic value of nature', which are based on a Naturalist View of 
Nature.  
 
 
VIII. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE  
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF A SYSTEMIC ETHIC 
 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of the present paper is to investigate the ethi-
cal basis for sustainability and precaution. An outline of a systemic ethic has been pre-
sented and discussed, and although space does not allow us to draw all the relevant im-
plications of this framework here, some preliminary remarks can be given.  
 
The systemic ethic enables us to understand and analyse sustainability and precaution as 
moral concepts on equal terms with the traditional moral concepts of humanist, indi-
vidualistic ethics. It provides a tool for structuring and criticising the different meanings 
of new normative concepts of environmental concern. In particular, the systemic ethic 
points to reflexive precaution and functional integrity as the proper, more general un-
derstandings of precaution and sustainability.64 And it provides those new norms that are 
in agreement with the systemic ethic, with a stronger moral basis that can give them 
more credence and influence.  
 
Furthermore, the systemic ethic provides options for analysing and criticising traditional 
ethical concepts from a new perspective. For example, by way of including the un-
known consequences of human action as important moral grounds of action, the sys-
temic ethic directs attention to our means of knowing consequences and impacts, as well 
as to the influence of context on knowledge. In this way, the systemic ethic provides a 
basis for criticising rationalistic moral theories. And bringing together systemic (or 
communitarian) ethics and individualistic ethics in a common framework presents a 
different basis for discussion than that of opposing theories.  
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The systemic ethic gives reason to take the reflexive understanding of precaution as a 
more general sense of precaution. The development of new technologies with unfore-
seeable consequences gives rise to a critique of the adequacy of rational decision-
making based on scientific knowledge, such as in the case of pesticides, antibiotic 
growth promoters, and genetically modified organisms in agriculture. Reflexive precau-
tion includes rational precaution, such as risk assessments, as a means of dealing with 
known consequences, while emphasising more general moral principles of acting, such 
as those entailed in the precautionary principle, in front of unknown consequences.  
 
Systemic moral considerability presents the relationship between man and nature as 
something of moral value and not merely an instrumental relation. Therefore, the sys-
temic ethic gives reason to see functional integrity as a more general understanding of 
sustainability, which employs the thinking of resource sufficiency as a way of dealing 
with known consequences where a distinctive view of nature is appropriate, while em-
phasising the active responsibility for sustaining the ecological community.  
 
In view of the systemic ethic, the concern for our future self and future generations can 
be seen as an aspect of systemic moral considerability, which is quite different from the 
individualistic approach to sustainability that is hampered with theoretical problems.65 
In the systemic perspective, the question of 'our future selves' involves an extension of 
the self as an object – an extension of 'me'. Our concern for the future of our children 
can be seen as a concern for a slightly (but only slightly) wider conception of 'me'. This 
perspective provides reason for a further concern for future generations – or future 
socio-ecological systems – on grounds of it being in this sense our own future. The 
grandparents of our grandchildren can be anyone among our contemporaries, even 
though we do not know whom (and this is a point for moral reflection in itself), and the 
ecological community of our grandchildren will be a descendant of the societies and 
ecosystems of today.  
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